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Review Essays 
ALTERNATIVE MAPS FOR NAVIGATING 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT MAZE 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Daniel Farber.1 
Foundation Press. New York, NY. 1998. Pp. xi, 298. 
$29.95. 
Alan E. Brownstein2 
Daniel Farber has written a concise, sophisticated, and 
probing text on First Amendment doctrine for students. It is a 
thoughtful work that encourages readers to try to evaluate the 
Court's analysis as well as to develop an adequate understanding 
of important case holdings. Farber's writing style is clear and di-
rect. Most of the time, his discussion of rules and standards are 
appropriately illustrated with useful examples. He uses humor 
occasionally to entertain as well as to enlighten. I liked the 
book, learned quite a bit in reading it, and got some good ideas 
about how to present certain issues in class from it. What I'm 
not sure about is whether I would assign the book to my stu-
dents. 
The problem is that this book is Farber on the First 
Amendment and I teach, not surprisingly, Brownstein on the 
First Amendment. Law professors often create a framework for 
understanding legal material, of course, but in most cases there is 
a sufficiently agreed upon core of doctrine that one scholar's de-
scription of the law can be profitably used by the students of an-
other teacher. Current First Amendment doctrine, however, 
1. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
2. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, B.A. 1%9, Antioch College; 
J.D. 1977, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Vikram Amar for reading 
drafts of this Review and for providing helpful criticism. 
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may have reached such a point of incoherence and indetermi-
nacy that this kind of common understanding no longer exists.3 
The gaps and inconsistencies in the case law permit simply far 
too many plausible interpretations of the cases and legitimate 
ways to order them. 
Thus, scholars writing books of modest size for students 
about the First Amendment may be forced to choose between 
two less than desirable alternatives. One can simplify, but essen-
tially regurgitate, the reasoning of the various Justices in impor-
tant cases. Consensus is possible under this approach. We might 
all agree that Justice Kennedy said "XXX" in a particular opin-
ion. But this kind of a largely descriptive work is ultimately un-
satisfying to the serious scholar and student. The goal of legal 
analysis is to go beyond what the Court says in specific cases and 
to try to find, or create, a more intelligible doctrinal picture than 
the bare reasoning and holdings of individual cases provide. A 
concise description of cases will not evaluate the Court's deci-
sions or try to synthesize and interpret ostensibly divergent 
holdings. It isn't going to support the creation of new para-
digms, it isn't going to be helpful in resolving problems where 
there is no case directly on point, and it isn't going to be much 
fun to write or read. Farber is far too smart and too interested in 
free speech issues to write a book like this. And The First 
Amendment isn't such a book. 
The other approach is to write a book self-consciously im-
posing one's personal understanding of free speech doctrine on 
to the raw material of the Court's decisions. This is exciting and 
interesting work, but it can hardly be passed off to students as 
accepted wisdom. Much of this kind of an analysis will be con-
troversial; it will be persuasive to some readers and completely 
unconvincing to others. Quite a lot of it will never be endorsed 
in a judicial opinion. It is clearly possible for someone who has 
thought about free speech doctrine as much as Farber has to 
write this kind of a book, but The First Amendment isn't that kind 
of a book either. 
It is something in between. There may be more creative 
doctrinal development and discussion in the book, more of Far-
ber's own sense of how the First Amendment works, than even 
3. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffren, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance 3 
(Harvard U. Press, 1990) (comparing current First Amendment doctrine to the Internal 
Revenue Code); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 
1249, 1249-50 (1995) (noting "internal incoherence" of free speech doctrine). 
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the author realizes.4 This is hardly a weakness in conventional 
terms. Indeed, it is what makes the book a valuable resource. 
But it is also in a sense what makes the book incomplete. The 
problem with a book of this length- that goes substantially be-
yond a recitation of the content of judicial opinions in order to 
impose order and meaning on the case law-is that it leaves out, 
necessarily, too many of the legitimate ways to understand the 
free speech issues the Court has been confronting. In blunt 
terms, it simply may not be possible any longer to write the kind 
of book that Farber has attempted to write in The First Amend-
ment. It may not be possible to write a probing, critical discus-
sion of free speech doctrine that is generally useful for teaching 
purposes today unless one allocates far more pages to the enter-
prise than either Farber or Foundation Press thought was ap-
propriate. 
In this review, I am going to focus on two sections of his 
book where Farber's analysis and selectivity in including argu-
ments creates too much dissonance with the way that I under-
stand the cases and issues for his work to be useful to me in 
teaching my classes. Instead of noting various disagreements 
that I may have with his analysis, as book reviewers typically do, 
however, I thought it might be more useful to provide compara-
tive frameworks to help illustrate the differences between Far-
ber's approach and my own. Accordingly, after summarizing the 
way Farber discusses the issues in these sections, I will describe 
the way I would present the same material. That comparison, 
hopefully, will demonstrate why it might be difficult for students 
to shift from one perspective to the other. Then, after juxtapos-
ing alternative discussions of two free speech areas at some 
length, I will briefly sketch similar problems in a few other sec-
tions of Farber's work. 
Of course, other readers might have less of a problem with 
the areas of The First Amendment that bother me, but would 
identify different sections of this work, sections that I found to 
be thorough and persuasive, as incomplete or off center from 
their perspective. The point isn't that any of these competing 
understandings of free speech cases and principles is necessarily 
more accurate and convincing than Farber's analysis. Rather, it 
is that under the current state of free speech case law we do not 
4. Professor Farber suggested to me in an e-mail message that his purpose in 
writing this book was to describe current doctrine rather than to present his own views 
on the meaning of the First Amendment. Electronic Mail from Daniel Farber to Alan 
Brownstein (July 23, 1998) (on file with author ("Electronic Mail")). 
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have an adequate, agreed-upon foundation on which we can 
stand and evaluate alternative doctrinal interpretations. Be-
cause of the seemingly systemic indeterminacy in so many free 
speech cases, we are left in a doctrinal world in which I seriously 
dispute very little of what Farber writes in this book, but I some-
times see things very differently or emphasize very different as-
pects of an issue in my classes. 
I. CONTENT DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTENT 
NEUTRAL SPEECH REGULATIONS 
A. CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION 
Farber raises an extraordinarily large number of issues in 
his discussion of content-neutral, content-discriminatory, and 
viewpoint-discriminatory regulations in a very few pages.5 He 
describes the relevant standards of review for each category, ex-
amines the difficulty of determining in which category a par-
ticular regulation belongs, and, perhaps most importantly, evalu-
ates the utility of, and justifications for, the framework the Court 
has adopted. Much of his writing is extremely concise in light of 
the richness of the ideas he is expressing. For example, in dis-
cussing the difficulty in distinguishing content-discriminatory 
from content-neutral regulations, Farber explains that "[l]ooking 
at the face of the statute seems both too broad and too narrow-
too broad, because . . . there may be non-suspect reasons for 
keying the regulation to content,6 and too narrow, because it al-
lows clever drafters to target disfavored speech, so long as they 
do so covertly."7 I would not assign too many pages of this book 
to students for any one setting. This is material that needs to be 
5. Farber acknowledges how heavily condensed his analysis is near the end of his 
book when he reminds the reader that "(t)he topic of almost every chapter in this book is 
complex enough to warrant a book in its own right." Daniel Farber, The First Amend· 
ment 243 (Foundation Press, 1998). If anything he understates the complexity of the ma-
terial. There are sentences in this book that might be the subject of long law review arti-
cles. See, notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
6. Id at 29. A discussion of this issue might include both secondary effects cases, 
see, notes 24-25 and accompanying text, and an explanation of many of the exceptions to 
the rule requiring strict scrutiny review of content-discriminatory restrictions within a 
category of unprotected speech that Justice Scalia describes in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 u.s. 377 (1992). 
7. Farber, First Amendment at 29 (cited in note 5). The issue here is the perplex-
ing problem of how to deal with facially neutral, but invidiously motivated, regulations 
that are designed to disproportionately burden particular viewpoints of expression. 
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chewed on thoroughly if it is going to be digested without dis-
comfort. 
In discussing what constitutes prohibited viewpoint-
discrimination, Farber effectively zeroes in on what I take to be 
the critical issue. Determining whether what a regulation pro-
hibits "counts as an opposing viewpoint," he explains, is inher-
ently ambiguous "because this depends on how we conceptualize 
the relevant debate."8 Thus, part of the disagreement between 
the concurring justices and the majority in City of St. Paul v. 
R.A. V. reflected differing views of the kinds of disputes at which 
the hate speech law challenged in the case might be directed.9 
To Justice Stevens, the law applied equally to both sides in a dis-
pute between the members of different racial groups. To Justice 
Scalia, the law discriminated against racists engaged in a debate 
with opponents of racism. 10 
I might have gone further than Farber does and suggested 
that the difficulty the Court experiences in identifying the rele-
vant debate in R.A. V. carries the seeds within it of undermining 
the essential idea that there is something distinctive about view-
point-discrimination. After all, it is hard to identify a content-
discriminatory regulation that does not restrict the expression of 
a viewpoint in some hypothetical debate. 11 Even an ostensibly 
innocuous, subject matter regulation that prohibits speech about 
dogs, for example, may directly restrict at least one of the view-
points that might be expressed in a debate about what consti-
tutes the best household pet.12 Certainly, Farber's analysis goes 
more than far enough on this issue for a student text, however. 
B. CONTENT-NEUTRALREGULATIONS 
1. The Meaning of Content-Neutrality 
Where I part company from The First Amendment most sig-
nificantly is in its discussion of content-neutral regulations. For 
8. Id at 31. 
9. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391-92. 
10. Id. 
11. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n, /nt'/ v. Department of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 
1159-60 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that a ban on a general category of speech, such as 
political speech, may still be viewpoint discriminatory because some speech on a specific 
subject might not be considered "political" and would be permitted while a "political" 
message expressing the contrary view would be suppressed). 
12. These ideas developed out of a series of e-mail conversations with Eugene Vo-
lokh. 
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the purposes of his analysis, Farber chooses to collapse three 
kinds of laws together: laws that directly regulate a time, place or 
conventional manner of expression, e.g., a law prohibiting leaf-
leting; laws directed at conduct that is generally not engaged in 
for expressive purposes, but which in a given case is engaged in 
to communicate a message, e.g., sleeping in a park to demon-
strate the plight of the homeless; and laws directed at conduct 
that is not generally engaged for expressive purposes and is not 
intended to communicate a message in the case at hand.13 
Apparently, Farber elects to structure his discussion this 
way for two reasons. First, the Court appears to have concluded 
that the standards of review for the first two types of regulation 
are roughly equivalent.14 At least, the Court claims that this is so 
in several decisions.15 Second, Farber suggests that the standard 
of review for content-neutral regulations is so deferential today 
that it is extremely unlikely that any laws will be struck down 
under it. To Farber, virtually all content-neutral laws will be up-
held unless they "entirely foreclose a traditional channel of 
communication such as lawn signs" and they will sometimes be 
upheld even in that circumstance. 16 It is the Court's lack of rigor 
in reviewing all content-neutral laws, even those that are clearly 
directed at speech, that leads Farber to conclude that the only 
variable that really matters in practical terms under current doc-
trine is whether a regulation is content-based or not. That is why 
he argues it is hardly worth a court or a student's time to even 
determine whether the conduct being regulated by a law "is clas-
sified as speech or not."17 
13. See generally Farber, First Amendment at 27-41 (cited in note 5). 
14. Id at 25-27. 
15. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984); 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,797-98 (1989). These opinions both suggest 
that there is very little difference, if any, between the multi-factor test applied to time, 
place, and manner regulations and the standard for reviewing regulations of symbolic 
speech set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
16. Farber, First Amendment at 2 (cited in note 5) (comparing City Council of L.A. 
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding law banning signs on utility 
poles) with City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (striking down law prohibiting use 
of lawn signs)). 
17. Id at 41. In an e-mail message, Professor Farber indicated that he recognizes 
that a neutral statute regulating conventionally nonexpressive conduct that is not being 
engaged in for expressive purposes would be subject to a rational basis standard of re-
view. This would be "quite different" than the review applied to either time, place, and 
manner regulations or restrictions on symbolic speech. Electronic Mail (cited in note 4). 
Farber's discussion on this point in The First Amendment blurs this distinction, however. 
See Farber, First Amendment at 41 (cited in note 5) (explaining that "since the O'Brien 
test is applied so favorably to the government, it makes very little difference in most 
cases whether conduct is classified as speech or not, so long as the government's regula-
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Having conceptualized the issue in these terms, Farber 
spends very little time explaining or evaluating the standard of 
review that the Court applies to content-neutral laws. He says 
almost nothing about the requirement that regulations must 
leave open "ample channels for communication" of the speaker's 
message. With regard to the narrow tailoring requirement, he 
recites the Court's conclusions in Ward v. Rock Against Racism18 
that a regulation need not employ the least restrictive alternative 
available to the government as long as it does not "burden sub-
stantially more speech than is necessary to further the govern-
ment's legitimate interests."19 This means, to Farber, that a law 
will only be struck down as inadequately tailored "if it could 
achieve the government's purposes effectively while covering 
substantially less speech. "20 
What Farber does focus on, not surprisingly, is how the 
Court determines whether a law is content-neutral or not. The 
primary cases he addresses in exploring this question are United 
States v. 0 'Brien,21 the draft card burning case, United States v. 
Eichman,22 the flag burning case, and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc. ,23 the nude dancing case. He concludes that the justices are 
hopelessly fragmented in identifying a test for defining content 
neutrality as the myriad approaches applied in Barnes demon-
strate. Thus, a law might be content-neutral because (1) "the 
law would equally apply if no message at all [is] being communi-
cated by the conduct," (2) "the persuasive effect of the message" 
expressed by the regulated conduct is not "a necessary part of 
the government's justification for regulating [it]," (3) the gov-
ernment's purpose in enacting the law is not to suppress or con-
demn the message communicated by the regulated conduct, or 
(4) the law on its face does not draw a distinction based on con-
tent. Farber explains how each of these approaches is problem-
atic in at least some respects.24 
tion is content-neutral"). 
18. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
19. ld See Farber, First Amendment at 26 (cited in note 5). 
20. ld. 
21. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
22. 496 u.s. 310 (1990). 
23. 501 u.s. 560 (1991 ). 
24. Farber, First Amendment at 28-29 (cited in note 5). 
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2. Distinguishing Among "Neutral" Regulations that Directly 
Burden Speech 
None of this analysis is wrong. All of it is useful. Most of it 
is very different from the way I would discuss this topic. To be-
gin with, I would focus my discussion initially on content-neutral 
regulations of speech; time, place, and manner regulations that 
restrict conventionally expressive activities such as leafleting, 
residential picketing, soliciting, using loud speakers and the like. 
For the most part, no one seriously disputes that these laws are 
content-neutral on their face. Before addressing the regulation 
of other kinds of conduct such as draft card burning or nude 
dancing, I would develop in some depth the Court's under-
standing of content-neutrality in cases involving the regulation of 
what everyone recognizes to be speech all the time. 
Moreover, I think that examining the facial content of the 
law is clearly the first step in such an analysis. Presumptively, a 
law that is content-neutral on its face is a content-neutral regula-
tion of speech for the purposes of First Amendment review and 
a law that is content- discriminatory on its face is a content-
discriminatory regulation of speech. There are exceptions, of 
course, but they vary as to their scope in free speech cases, and, 
more importantly, as to whether they reflect broader, boundary 
crossing concerns that apply to a wide range of constitutional in-
terests. 
a. Secondary Effects 
The primary exception suggesting that a law may be con-
tent-discriminatory on its face, but should still be reviewed as if 
it were a content-neutral regulation, relates to laws that are di-
rected at the secondary effects of speech. There is onl~ one case, 
however, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., where a 
majority of the Court actually applied the secondary effects doc-
trine to uphold a law. Further, all the other circumstances in 
which the doctrine is discussed favorably in dicta or by individual 
justices involve indecent or otherwise unprotected or lesser pro-
tected speech.26 Until the secondary effects analysis is used more 
25. 475 u.s. 41 (1986). 
26. Renton itself involves the constitutionality of a dispersal zoning ordinance re-
stricting the location of adult bookstores and movie theaters. Id Other Supreme Court 
cases which discuss secondary effects, but do not ground their holdings on this doctrine, 
include: Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct 2329, 2342 (1997) (construing statute regulating inde-
cent speech on the Internet to be directed at the "primary" effect of indecent speech); 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that statute pro-
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expansively, it is more appropriately recognized as an exception 
to the general rule (and a dubious, result-oriented one at that) 
rather than as an aspect of content-neutrality that influences the 
definition of the concept. 
b. The Problems of Generality and Motive 
In addition to the exception of laws directed at secondary 
effects, there are two related problems that complicate the appli-
cation of any test that relies on the content of the regulation as a 
basis for determining its neutrality. First, there is the question of 
generality. How should we evaluate a law that sweeps so 
broadly that it restricts both speech and non-speech related ac-
tivities? A ban on loud speakers only restricts speech. A noise 
ordinance restricts non-communicative equipment such as leaf 
blowers, fault~ mufflers, and air conditioners as well as expres-
sive activities. 7 At a minimum, general laws of this kind are con-
tent-neutral. The harder question here would be whether we 
should review the noise ordinance as a content-neutral regula-
tion of speech because of the burden it imposes on expressive ac-
tivities (even though the law is not directed exclusively at 
speech) or whether we should review it as a law outside the cov-
erage of the First Amendment under a rational basis test. 
This issue transcends freedom of speech doctrine. Under 
the Free Exercise Clause, it was resolved against the rigorous re-
view of general laws that substantially burden both religious 
hibiting public nudity can be constitutionally employed to prohibit nude dancing at a 
sexually oriented business because of secondary effects associated with such establish-
ments): FWIPBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (failing to reach issue of 
whether ordinance regulating sexually oriented business is aimed at secondary effects 
because city's licensing scheme lacks procedural safeguards required by First Amend-
ment); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 708 (1986) (O'Connor, 1., concurring) 
(mentioning "perceived secondary effects" as a possible basis for closing down a store 
selling indecent books); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 
(1976) (discussing the zoning of adult movie theaters). 
The only case in which the Court considered secondary effects doctrine in reviewing 
a regulation that was not directed at sexually oriented expression, such as the inventory 
of an adult business, was Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). In Boos, a three justice 
plurality opinion refused to apply a secondary effects analysis to the review of a statute 
prohibiting anyone from displaying within 500 feet of a foreign embassy any banners or 
signs intended to bring a foreign government into public odium or disrepute. The Court 
construed the challenged regulation to "focus on the direct impact of speech on its audi-
ence," not on secondary effects. 
27. In my home community of Davis, California, a resident was cited for violating 
the city's noise ordinance because she allegedly snored too loudly. The citation was later 
dismissed. The cited resident successfully sued the city and recovered $13,500. Howard 
Beck, Seu/ement Silences Snoring Story, Davis Enterprise A1 (March 26, 1995). By all 
accounts the snoring was not expressive in nature. 
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practices and non-religiously motivated activities in Employment 
Division v. Smith.l.P, Justice Scalia has also suggested that it is 
relevant to Takings Clause decisions.29 The issue has also arisen 
in abortion cases where the state, for example, attempts to 
regulate all out-patient surgical clinics, not only those that pro-
vide abortion services.30 Instead of discussing this controversy in 
isolation as a problem with defining content-neutrality for First 
Amendment purposes, I would locate it more centrally in fun-
damental rights jurisprudence first and then go on to consider it 
in the context of free speech cases. 
Second, and more directly related to the issue of neutrality, 
is the problem of disproportionate impact and invidious motive. 
A time, place, and manner regulation may be facially neutral but 
predictably more burdensome to a particular point of view and, 
perhaps, deliberately so. No one believes that speakers who op-
pose abortion rights and speakers who support abortion rights 
are equally burdened by an ordinance prohibiting picketing 
within 20 feet of the entrance to a medical clinic.31 Should we 
evaluate such a law as a content-neutral regulation of speech, 
because the law is neutral on its face, even if plaintiffs submit 
convincing evidence that the ordinance was enacted for the spe-
cific purpose of silencing anti-abortion protestors? Or, instead, 
28. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
29. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 n.14 (1992). 
30. Compare Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. City of Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 
633 (W.D. La 1980) (upholding under deferential review zoning decision preventing 
clinic providing abortion services from locating in an area limited to medical clinics that 
do not provide inpatient care or operating rooms for major surgery); Abortion Coalition 
of Mich. v. Michigan Dept. of Pub. Health, 426 F. Supp. 471 (E. D. Mich. 1977) (sustaining 
statutes providing for the licensing and regulation of "freestanding surgical outpatient 
facilities" on the grounds that challenged laws do not specifically burden the right to have 
an abortion); Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that "(a] 
state can impose the same regulations on a clinic specifically built to perform abortions 
during the first trimester, that are imposed on other clinics that perform surgical proce-
dures requiring approximately the same degree of skill and care as the performance of 
first trimester abortions"), with Ragsdale v. Turnock, 625 F. Supp. 1212, 1229-30 (N.D. 
Ill. 1985) (requiring that "any regulation, even a general regulation, which burdens a 
woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester [must fur-
ther a) compelling governmental interest"); Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of 
Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that even regulations universally ap-
plied to all medical procedures must further a compelling state interest if they burden the 
right to have an abortion); Indiana Hospital Licensing Council v. Woman's Pavilion of S. 
Bend, Inc., 420 N.E. 2d 1301, 1315 (1981) (explaining that under due process analysis 
state enacting neutral regulations "must nevertheless provide compelling reasons for any 
regulation of a fundamental right"). 
31. See Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1216 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(explaining that the fact that the majority of those prosecuted under ordinance restricting 
demonstrations outside of health care facilities are protesting abortion services does not 
undermine content-neutral status of challenged law). 
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should such a law be more properly reviewed as a content or 
viewpoint discriminatory restriction of speech?32 
Again, this is not an issue that is unique to free speech juris-
prudence. It applies across the spectrum of many fundamental 
rights. We often confront laws that are facially neutral, but 
which disproportionately burden one of two or more classes that 
the Constitution requires to be treated equally. Typically, tore-
solve the case it is necessary to determine the propriety of direct 
inquiries into the legislature's motives.33 Addressing this issue 
exclusively as a problem in defining content-neutral speech 
regulations suggests that the problem results from the way that 
the Court has structured free speech doctrine. In fact, it is a 
problem intrinsic to the protection of any constitutionally pro-
tected interest and one that applies with particular force to those 
interests containing an equality dimension. 
c. Political Process Analysis 
Both of these problems raise questions about the constitu-
tional significance of generalizing the scope of a law in a way 
that broadens its impact. And in both cases, there is at least one 
common response. Under a political process model of constitu-
tional interpretation, we trust the results of the political process 
more when the costs and burdens of regulation are spread widely 
so that the majority pays a price for obtaining whatever public 
benefits allegedly result from the regulation of speech.34 This ar-
gument may not provide a terribly persuasive basis for reviewing 
a law directed at speech, such as a loudspeaker ban, more rigor-
ously than a broader regulation, such as a noise ordinance. It is 
not obvious that the social interests burdened by the broader 
law, people who use leaf blowers or other loud but non-
communicative equipment, for example, represent the kind of 
constituency whose burdening by a law will materially help toes-
tablish that the results of the political process deserve respect. A 
more powerful political process argument applies to content-
neutral speech regulations that disproportionately burden some 
points of view more than others. While a ban on picketing in 
32. There is a general consensus on the Supreme Court that disproportionate im-
pact alone without proof of invidious motive will not justify more rigorous review of a 
facially content-neutrallaw. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989). 
33. See Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use 
Regulation Process, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1988). 
34. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Pecu-
liar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81, 111 (1978). 
112 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.16:101 
front of medical clinics, or a ban on residential picketing, may 
disproportionately burden opponents of abortion, such a law will 
also restrict the expressive activities of labor unions and other 
politically powerful groups for whom site specific speech is of 
recognized value. The increased difficulty of adopting a law that 
burdens a host of possible speakers provides some justification 
for trusting the political system's conclusion that the benefits of 
the law justify its costs.35 
3. Content-Neutrality and Symbolic Speech 
After establishing this foundation by examining time, place, 
and manner speech regulations, I think it is easier to talk about 
the more complicated issue of identifying content neutrality in 
the context of symbolic speech, the cases with which Farber be-
gins his discussion. Once again, we confront the same two re-
lated problems. A law prohibiting public nudity or draft card 
burning restricts both non-expressive and expressive conduct 
just like the noise ordinance mentioned above. And again, as 
was true with the noise ordinance, it is necessary to determine 
whether the law should be reviewed as a regulation of speech at 
all.36 But there are special characteristics of symbolic speech 
cases that distinguish them from those involving generic ordi-
nances that regulate both conventionally expressive and non-
expressive activities. 
The primary problem is that many kinds of symbolic speech 
are directly associated with particular messages. For these kinds 
of speech, there really is nothing analogous to the conventional 
time, place, and manner regulation. In essence, the law is really 
either a content, or, perhaps, even a viewpoint, discriminatory 
35. Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Con-
duct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-abonion Protests. 29 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 553,608-09 (1996). Farber seldom mentions political process arguments in 
The First Amendment. His reluctance to do so may be explained, reasonably enough, by 
the current Court's lack of interest in such analysis. Still, the Supreme Court that devel-
oped the free speech framework under discussion was heavily influenced by political pro-
cess reasoning. The fact that the current Court has abandoned at least part of the intel-
lectual foundation on which the framework rests raises legitimate questions about its 
long term viability. 
36. There is one formal sense in which a law prohibiting sleeping in the park, for 
example, is different than the noise ordinance. The noise ordinance prohibits different 
activities, some of which are engaged in for expressive purposes, e.g. loudspeakers, and 
others which do not serve communicative goals, e.g. leaf blowers. The law prohibiting 
sleeping in the park restricts only one activity, sleeping in the park. The law generalizes 
and extends beyond speech because many people sleep in parks for non-expressive rea-
sons. I do not think anything substantive turns on this distinction. 
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regulation or it is not a regulation of speech at all. For example, 
I would argue that a law prohibiting the burning of draft cards 
only when the card is burned for communicative purposes is a 
content discriminatory law. Unlike leafleting and other conven-
tional means of expression which are used to express any of a 
wide variety of messages, burning draft cards, like burning flags, 
has a far more limited communicative range. For this kind of 
speech, a law prohibiting the burning of a draft card to commu-
nicate a message and a law prohibiting the burning of a draft 
card to deliver a dissident political message may be indistin-
guishable for First Amendment purposes. 
This association does not always exist. I think that Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence37 was a relatively easy 
symbolic speech case because the conduct of sleeping in parks is 
not associated with any particular message. Draft card burning, 
flag burning and nude dancing, however, are all associated with a 
very limited range of messages. And the narrower the range of 
meaning attributed to conduct engaged in for expressive pur-
poses, the greater the likelihood that the law regulating the con-
duct is content or viewpoint discriminatory if it is determined to 
be a law directed at the regulation of speech at all. That is why 
in the flag burning cases, once the majority determines that the 
flag burning prohibition is directed at flag burning for expressive 
purposes, the Court also concludes that the law is content-
discriminatory.38 
Perhaps the best analogy to the symbolic speech cases might 
be a noise ordinance restricting the level of sounds of any kind 
greater than a certain decibel outside of a medical clinic. Here, 
as is true of the tough symbolic speech cases, judicial review of 
the law necessarily collapses the question of whether the regula-
tion should be evaluated as a regulation of speech into the ques-
tion of whether the regulation is content-neutral or content-
discriminatory. Since the justification for avoiding loud noises 
outside of medical clinics seems so obvious and so devoid of any 
message suppressing intent, absent direct proof of an invidious 
motive, this law should certainly be upheld. The open question 
is whether it should receive the same very deferential review 
provided to the law prohibiting sleeping in the park in Clark or 
whether the Court should evaluate it as a content-neutral but di-
37. 468 u.s. 288 (1984). 
38. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 411-412 (1989). 
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rect regulation of speech because of its more obvious implica-
tions for conventional expressive activity.39 
One might argue that a law restricting the level of sounds of 
any kind greater than a certain decibel outside of only those 
medical clinics that provide abortion services, however, should 
receive much more rigorous review. It is, after all, difficult to 
explain why only noises outside of medical clinics providing 
abortion services serve the neutral goal of avoiding the disrup-
tion of medical treatment. A noise ordinance protecting only 
clinics providing abortion services, like the flag burning law, 
might be construed to have only one possible purpose, a content-
discriminatory one.40 
If there is no direct proof of invidious motive, these latter 
cases may be extremely difficult to resolve, but I am not certain 
that this difficulty has all that much to do with the nature of con-
tent neutrality. Sometimes a law may be ostensibly neutral on its 
face, but its application is such that it can not reasonably be un-
derstood as serving anything other than an invidious purpose, or 
at least one that requires rigorous constitutional review. In the 
symbolic speech cases involving nude dancing or flag burning, 
those justices who argued that the challenged laws were content-
discriminatory believed that no purpose other than a content-
discriminatory one could explain the enactment and enforce-
ment of these laws.41 But it is obviously difficult to establish that 
a law can serve only one purpose and it is not surprising that dif-
ferent justices may not agree that such a conclusion is justified in 
a given case.42 Still other justices may argue with some justifica-
tion that such an inference should never be permitted, for rea-
sons associated with their understanding of the proper role of 
constitutional judges.43 
39. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (upholding antinoise 
ordinance governing area around public schools because law "is narrowly tailored to fur-
ther (city's] compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the 
student's learning. and does not unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment rights.") 
40. One might argue that the city enacted an ordinance solely limiting noise outside 
of abortion clinics because these are the only medical facilities at which loud demonstra-
tions occur. Why should the city adopt a law that is broader than necessary to solve the 
problem at which it is directed? Not all noise that might interfere with the operation of a 
medical facility is caused by demonstrations, however, and labor demonstrations, rallies 
directed against managed care, as well as other protests might occur at a wide range of 
clinics and hospitals. 
41. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 591-94 (1991) (White, J., dissenting); 
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 317-18;Johnson, 491 U.S. at412, 416-17. 
42. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570-71; Eichman, 496 U.S. at 320-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 438-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
43. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 579-80 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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4. The Standard of Review for Content-Neutral Laws 
a. Evaluating the Rigor of Review 
I am not sure whether Dan Farber would agree with the 
above analysis. Most of it is superfluous to the analysis pre-
sented in The First Amendment because Farber concludes that the 
standard of review applied to content-neutral regulations of con-
ventional expressive activities, symbolic speech, or non-
expressive conduct is so low that it is hardly worth the effort to 
differentiate among these regulations.44 Even if this conclusion is 
correct, I think it is important for the sake of conceptual clarity 
to distinguish these regulations and the review they receive from 
each other. But in point of fact I am not sure his conclusion is 
accurate at least as it applies to content-neutral laws that directly 
regulate speech. I think there may be more bite to this standard 
of review than Farber suggests.45 
44. Farber, First Amendment at 26,41 (cited in note 5). 
45. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has seldom found a content-
neutral regulation of speech to be invalid on First Amendment grounds during the last 10 
to 15 years. There have been a few exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. National Treas-
ury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (striking down law that prohibits federal em-
ployees from accepting any compensation for making speeches or writing articles even 
though regulation does not discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint); City of 
Ladue v. Gil/eo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (invalidating content-neutral ordinance banning all 
residential signs); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (invalidating law prohibiting pay-
ment to those who collect signatures on initiative petitions); United States v. Grace, 461 
U.S. 171 (1983) (striking down content-neutral ban on the display of banners, flags, or 
other expressive devises in the Supreme Court building and its adjoining grounds and 
sidewalk). And the Supreme Court has struck down certain provisions of content-
neutral injunctions restricting speech although it has applied a more rigorous standard of 
review in doing so. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 
(1997) (invalidating specific provisions of content-neutral injunction limiting expressive 
activity outside of medical clinics providing abortion services); Madsen v. Women's 
Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (same). Still, the Court's track record has hardly been 
inspiring on this issue. 
The decisions of lower federal courts tell a different story, however. Here, content-
neutral regulations of speech will often be held unconstitutional under relatively careful 
review. See, e.g., NMI Perry v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 121 F.3d 1365 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(striking down content-neutral law prohibiting the sale of goods or solicitation of funds 
on sidewalks and boardwalks adjoining the Pacific Ocean at Venice Beach); Bery v. City 
of N.Y., 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting visual artists from 
exhibiting or selling their work at public places without vendor's license of limited avail-
ability); Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(striking down ordinance restricting placement of signs in residential areas to window 
signs); ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (striking down 
application of park regulation prohibiting solicitation of donations to solicitors operating 
within small permit area reserved by the group seeking donations for a special event on 
National Mall); Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100 (6th Cir. 1995) (invali-
dating ordinance prohibiting residential picketing even if it does not occur directly in 
front of house that is the target of protest); Grossman v. City of Portlal1d, 33 F.3d 1200 
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Farber is certainly correct that the Court has stated on occa-
sion that as long as the state's goal is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of speech, regulations of the time, place, and manner of 
speech, and regulations of symbolic speech receive essentially 
the same standard of review.46 And there is no doubt that the 
standard of review applied to regulations that incidentally bur-
den symbolic speech is extremely weak. But this may be one of 
those situations in which it is more important to look at what the 
Court does than what it says. 
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,41 for ex-
ample, the Court upheld a ban on camping (for the purposes of 
the case, sleeping) in Lafayette Park across from the White 
House-even when the sleeping is engaged in for expressive 
purposes as part of a demonstration to draw attention to the 
plight of the homeless.48 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
repeatedly affirmed the functional equivalence of the 0 'Brien 
test applied to the regulation of symbolic speech and the multi-
factor balancing test applied to content-neutral regulations that 
limit the time, place, and manner of speech. But it is fair to ask 
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that content-neutral ordinance requiring advance permit to en-
gage in organized expressive activity in public park could not be constitutionally applied 
to small protest of only eight people); Gerritsen v. City of L.A., 994 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 
1993) (striking down regulation prohibiting distribution of leaflets in area of park adja-
cent to Mexican consulate and shopping and dining areas and invalidating permit policy 
governing handbill distributions in other areas of park); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachu-
setts Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1993) (invalidating guidelines prohibiting 
leafleting and solicitation in designated areas of subway stations); Arlington County Re-
publican Comm. v. Arlington County, Va., 983 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1993) (striking down 
ordinance limiting property owners to two temporary signs in residential districts); Hays 
County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111,118-20 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that Univer-
sity regulation prohibiting students from handing out a free newspaper with advertising 
on campus unless the students belong to a registered student group that agrees to spon-
sor the paper violates First Amendment even if it is content-neutral); Gaudiya Vaishnava 
Society v. City of S.F., 952 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that ordinance requiring 
non-profit groups selling T-shirts, stuffed animals, and jewelry with expressive messages 
to obtain peddler's license violates First Amendment); Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (declaring state statute prohibiting the harassment of persons engaged in 
hunting or preparing to hunt to be content-neutral but unconstitutional); United Food 
and Commercial Workers lnt'l Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1988) (striking 
down law prohibiting more than two pickets standing within 50 feet of entrance to prem-
ises being picketed). 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's apparent leniency in recent cases, the persis-
tence of lower federal courts in taking the review of content-neutral speech regulations 
seriously suggests that identifying a law as a content-neutral regulation of speech may 
have more than enough doctrinal significance to warrant the attention of professors, law 
students, and free speech litigators. 
46. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
47. 468 u.s. 288 (1984). 
48. Id 
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whether the actual reasoning applied in this case would be util-
ized to justify a similar regulation directed at conventionally ex-
pressive activities such as leafleting. 
As I read the Clark decision, there is no narrow tailoring 
requirement applied at all in the Court's analysis. The Court 
recognizes that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting 
the environment of the Park, and that permitting people to sleep 
in the park creates some risk that the environment would be ad-
versely impacted. Surprisingly, however, it suggests that nothing 
more is necessary to support the Park Services' regulation. The 
arguments by lower courts that the Park Services could satisfac-
torily further their goals by prohibiting only certain activities as-
sociated with camping while allowing demonstrators to sleep in 
the park is rejected out of hand as inappropriate meddling by the 
courts in administrative decisions. In a critical sentence in the 
majority opinion, the Court states that 
[l]f the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
the National Parks are adequately protected, which we think 
it has, and if the parks would be more exposed to harm with-
out the sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from 
invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable 
regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be 
carried out.49 
It seems clear that a similar argument could be applied to 
prohibit leafleting (or all demonstrations for that matter) in 
Lafayette Park. It is true that not every leaflet distributed will 
end up as litter on the ground, but some of them will. And it 
seems reasonable to suppose that there will be less litter if leaf-
leting is prohibited whether or not littering is independently 
prohibited just as it is reasonable to assume that there will be 
less of an environmental impact on the park if sleeping is pro-
hibited whether or not other activities associated with camping 
that are likely to cause more of a problem than the simple act of 
sleeping are independently prohibited. 
I do not believe that a ban on leafleting in Lafayette Park 
would be as cavalierly upheld by the Court as the ban on camp-
ing, however. Farber might disagree, but I am not sure about 
this. Farber does acknowledge that content-neutral "statutes 
that entirely foreclose a traditional channel of communication" 
49. ld at 297. 
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may be struck down.50 Leafleting is obviously a traditional chan-
nel of communication, but I am not clear whether a ban on leaf-
leting in a single park entirely forecloses a medium of expres-
sion. A ban on leafleting from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. seems even 
less like the complete foreclosure of a medium of expression, but 
I would think that even this more limited restriction on speech 
would receive far more serious consideration than the ban on 
sleeping in the park did in Clark. 
It is possible, of course, that the Court would apply the 
same standard of review to a ban on leafleting and a ban on 
sleeping in a park with equivalent rigor. The application of the 
standard might produce different results because of significant 
differences between the activities being regulated for First 
Amendment purposes. Perhaps the Court believes that there 
are virtually always ample alternative avenues of communication 
available when a person is prohibited from engaging in conduct 
that is not conventionally expressive. After all, the people who 
are prevented from sleeping in the park to address the plight of 
the homeless may still distribute leaflets and engage in the full 
range of conventionally expressive mediums to communicate 
their message. In this sense, there will always be more alterna-
tive avenues of expression available to a speaker when a chal-
lenged law that only restricts conduct that is not conventionally 
expressive is compared to a law that restricts the use of a tradi-
tional expressive medium since no normal means of getting one's 
message across has been impaired by the former regulation. 
The problem with this argument, however, is that it is en-
tirely relative. It does not require a court to reach a different re-
sult and strike down the challenged law when the regulation of 
leafleting in a park as opposed to sleeping in a park is subject to 
review. While there may be more functional, alternative ave-
nues of communication available to speakers protesting the 
plight of the homeless when a ban on sleeping in parks is en-
forced than is the case when a ban on leafleting is enforced, the 
fact remains that there are a host of alternative ways to commu-
nicate a message about the homeless to the national government 
even if leafleting in Lafayette Park is prohibited. If regulations 
sharply restricting a means of communication like leafleting raise 
serious First Amendment problems, and I hope and believe that 
they do, we have to be able to explain how the standard of re-
50. Farber, First Amendment at 26 (cited in note 5). 
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view the Court applies to content-neutral regulations justifies 
such a conclusion. 
b. Evaluating the Substance of Review: Ample Alternative 
A venues of Communication and Narrow Tailoring 
Unfortunately, Farber devotes very little attention to this is-
sue. He says almost nothing about the "ample alternative chan-
nels of communication" prong of the standard of review. While I 
agree that this factor often seems to be taken lightly by the 
Court, there are some cases where it is treated seriously.51 Those 
cases are worth mentioning because they help students to under-
stand not only where the Court is today, but also what we may 
have lost over time as the analysis in this area has changed. 
Even when the doctrinal battle seems over for the moment, it is 
important to understand what an earlier conflict was all about 
because shifts in interpretation that seem permanent may some-
times be open to reconsideration. 
Farber is more descriptive in his discussion of the narrow 
tailoring part of the test. Focusing on Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism/2 he explains that the Court seems to focus on two criteria. 
First, the Court suggests that a law will be upheld as long as the 
government demonstrates that its regulatory interest "would be 
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."53 Second, the 
Court states that a law will be struck down if it burdens "substan-
tially more speech than is necessary to further the government's 
legitimate interests."54 
51. In City of Ladue v. Gi/leo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994 ), the Court carefully noted the cost 
and utility of the means of expression being regulated in striking down an ordinance pro-
hibiting residential signs. "Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form 
of communication," the Court explained. "Especially for persons of modest means or 
limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute." Id at 57. In 
contrast, the Court was openly dismissive of similar arguments in City Council of L.A. v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), when it upheld an ordinance prohibiting the 
posting of signs on city owned utility poles. Here, the Court maintained that 
"(n]otwithstanding appellees' general assertions in their brief concerning the utility of 
political posters, nothing in the findings indicates that the posting of political posters on 
public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication, or that ap-
pellees' ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on 
expression." Id at 812. 
Earlier cases apply an analysis that is far closer to Gilleo than Taxpayers for Vincent. 
See, e.g., Manin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943) (noting the importance 
of door to door soliciting and leafleting, especially "to the poorly financed causes of little 
people"). 
52. 491 u.s. 781 (1989). 
53. ld. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albenini, 472 U.S. 675,89 (1985)). 
54. Id. 
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Farber puts these two ideas together and concludes that "a 
regulation is too broad if it could achieve the government's pur-
pose effectively while covering substantially less speech."55 
That's certainly what the Court says, but it is hardly clear as to 
what the Court means. It is an easy case if the challenged regu-
lation is more effective in furthering the government's interest, 
but no more burdensome to s~eech, than alternative approaches. 
Obviously, this law is upheld. 6 It is also clear that a law will be 
struck down if an alternative approach would be equally effec-
tive as the government's choice, but would burden speech far 
less substantially. Neither of these situations are particularly 
common, however. Most often, the challenged law will be more 
effective than the alternatives and it will burden speech more as 
well. In that circumstance, should the courts second guess the 
legislature or executive branch and choose a less effective and 
less burdensome regulatory approach? 
This problem will almost always arise when the expressive 
activity risks causing some kind of preventable harm, but it will 
not do so on every occasion. As was noted earlier, leafleting 
contributes to increased litter, but not every leaflet ends up on 
the ground. If a ban on leafleting and littering results in substan-
tially less litter than a ban on littering alone, should the ban be 
upheld or struck down under the Ward standard? Interestingly, 
the Court considers this exact issue in a footnote in Ward and 
concludes that a ban on leafleting is unconstitutional because 
many leaflets do not cause the harm that the government is try-
• 57 
mg to prevent. 
There may be a valid distinction here, but if there is, it is 
certainly a difficult one to apply. If we take the Court's explana-
tion for distinguishing a ban on leafleting seriously, one would 
think that in order to be upheld, a content-neutral law must al-
ways focus on the harm that the expressive activity causes (here 
litter) and not on the expressive activity itself (here leafleting) 
whenever a substantial amount of the expressive activity being 
regulated may not result in the harm the government seeks to 
avoid. But the Court has upheld complete bans on solicitation 
without any apparent concern that not all solicitation is disrup-
55. Farber, First Amendment at 26 (cited in note 5). 
56. That is how the Court understood the situation in Ward, 491 U.S. at 801-02 
(holding that the challenged regulation did not burden plaintiffs' speech in any significant 
way other than that which was necessary to further the city's legitimate interests). 
57. Id at 800 n.7. 
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tive or causes congestion all of the time.58 And under this rea-
soning, it is hard to understand why the ban on sleeping in 
Lafayette Park was upheld when a narrower regulation might 
have more precisely prohibited those activities associated with 
camping, such as campfires, that caused the kind of harm the 
Park Service sought to prevent. 
The above discussion is considerably longer than Farber's 
section on content-neutral regulations. I have never written out 
what I think a constitutional law class needs to understand about 
this subject before. I probably could be more concise than I 
have been if I worked at it, but my presentation would still be 
longer than the pages that The First Amendment allocates to this 
topic. More important than its increased length, my discussion 
starts at a different location than Farber's and travels along a dif-
ferent doctrinal route to get to its destination. My guess is that 
many other constitutional law professors will view my canvass of 
the law here as idiosyncratic and distinct-pretty much the same 
way that I view Dan Farber's summary. It is that reality that 
makes it so difficult to write the kind of book that Farber has at-
tempted to produce. 
II. TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL PUBLIC 
FORUMS, CUSTODIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND 
GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
A. PUBLIC AND NON-PUBLIC FORUMS 
Given the internal inconsistency of the Court's forum cases, 
Farber does a very good job in trying to untangle the maze of 
cases in this area. Unlike his discussion of content-neutral 
regulations, where in my judgment he jumped too quickly into 
the morass of symbolic speech regulations without laying a con-
ceptual foundation with the more conventional time, place and 
manner regulations, in this section Farber starts at the beginning 
and moves more slowly into the material. He addresses the basic 
question of how the regulation of speech on public property 
should be reviewed, evaluates the basic idea of a traditional 
public forum, and then briefly documents the Court's early 
struggles in developing coherent doctrine in this area.59 
58. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672 (1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
59. Farber, First Amendment at 167-71 (cited in note 5). 
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With this background established, Farber identifies the ba-
sic conflict in this area between two competing doctrinal models: 
an ad hoc functional approach under which government must 
demonstrate that expressive activity is incompatible with the use 
to which public property is being put in order to justify restric-
tions on speech, and a more deferential approach that provides 
government administrators considerable discretion in regulating 
expression on public property as long as their restrictions are 
viewpoint neutral and generally reasonable.60 He concludes that 
the Court "split the difference" between these approaches61 and 
catalogues the three types of forums the Court currently recog-
nizes in achieving this doctrinal compromise. Then, Farber de-
fines traditional public forums, limited public forums, and non-
public forums and describes how different types of speech regu-
lations will be reviewed under each rubric.62 
To his credit, Farber critically evaluates the framework the 
Court has adopted. His analysis includes a helpful discussion of 
the difficulty the Court has experienced in classifying property as 
one type of forum or another.63 The decision to limit traditional 
public forums to only historically recognized locations, essen-
tially streets and parks, is challenged.64 Farber also describes 
how easily a state may manipulate its regulation of property un-
der the Court's definition of limited and non-public forums to 
restrict expression and avoid serious review.6 He ultimately 
concludes, however, that the primary principle underlying the 
different standards of review among current forum categories 
does no more than recognize the state's power to enact reason-
able subject matter regulations of speech on public property 
other than streets and parks (unless the state deliberately waives 
its authority to do so). Both for functional and manageability 
reasons, Farber accepts the soundness of this approach.66 
After discussing the public forum cases, Farber turns his at-
tention to speech in the public sector, the title of the next chap-
ter in his book. He breaks down this analysis into three catego-
ries: Speech regulations in custodial institutions such as schools, 
prisons, and the military, speech regulations governing public 
60. Id at 172. 
61. Id 
62. Id at 172-84. 
63. ld at 181-84. 
64. Id at 184. 
65. ld 
66. Id at 185-86. 
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employees, and government funding of speech.67 Cases such as 
Tinker v. Des Moines, 68 and Hazelwood School Districr are in-
cluded in the school section of the first category. Pickering v. 
Board of Education/° Connick v. Myers/ 1 and the patronage 
cases ~Elrod v. _Burns,72 ~utan v. Republican Party/3 and Bran~i v. 
Finkel 4 ) are discussed m the government employment sectiOn. 
Rust v. Sullivan, 75 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univer-
sity of Virginia76 and unconstitutional condition issues are re-
served for the last section, which Farber frankly and correctly 
describes as an intractable puzzle at the present time.n 
B. AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECfiVE ON LIMITED AND NON-
PUBLIC FORUMS 
While one could point out a variety of nit-picking omissions 
and arguable errors in this section of The First Amendmenl8 my 
problem with assigning these pages to my students, once again, 
relates to different starting places and a different perspective on 
broader issues. While I find much more common ground here 
than I did in the content-neutral materials, the way I approach 
these issues differs from Farber's in two important and related 
respects. First, I view the non-public forum cases through a far 
more jaundiced eye than Farber does. I think the framework 
provided by the Court is less conceptually coherent than Far-
ber's overall analysis suggests. Further, far from "splitting the 
difference," the current doctrinal model, to my mind, is virtually 
67. Id at 187-205. 
68. 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
69. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
70. 391 u.s. 563 (1968). 
71. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
72. 427 u.s. 347 (1976). 
73. 497 u.s. 62 (1990). 
74. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
75. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
76. 515 u.s. 819 (1995). 
77. Farber, First Amendment at 202 (cited in note 5). 
78. For example, Farber neither uses nor explains the term designated public forum 
in his discussion. He refers only and explicitly to limited public forums. Courts often use 
one or the other of these terms, and sometimes both, however, and students need to un-
derstand whether the terms limited and designated public forums can be used inter-
changeably or whether there is a substantive difference between the two. 
In my judgment, the term "designated public forum" is most accurately applied 
when govemme~t elects to regulate property other than streets or parks as if the prop-
erty was a tradtttonal pubhc forum. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
The term "limited public forum" is more appropriately applied to the state's decision to 
open property to a more limited class of speakers. The Supreme Court does not always 
follow thts usage, however. See notes 108-111 and accompanying text. 
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a complete repudiation of the functional compatibility standard 
endorsed by more speech-protective justices in earlier cases in 
favor of a far more deferential approach. 
Second, I would not always define the scope of the catego-
ries that Farber employs in exactly the same way that he does. 
As I will explain shortly, I would be far more circumscribed 
about the category that Farber identifies as custodial institutions, 
particularly with regard to its application to schools. Further, I 
would spend far more time wrestling with the problem of classi-
fication. Thus, from my perspective, an important part of the 
problem with government speech and government subsidy cases 
is differentiating them from those situations where public forum 
analysis applies. Yet Farber spends very little time clarifying the 
boundary lines of these categories. 
1. The Conflicting Doctrinal Models: Rigorous Functional 
Compatibility or Deferential Respect to Property 
Administrators 
I would begin as Farber does in discussing traditional public 
forum doctrine. Our approaches diverge when we move beyond 
this foundation. To my mind, the review of speech regulations 
governing public property other than streets and parks repre-
sented a fairly stark conflict for the Court. While there were cer-
tainly disagreements among individual justices in particular cases 
dealing with traditional public forums, a clear consensus devel-
oped as to the appropriate standard of review for these areas. 
With regard to the review of restrictions of speech on other pub-
lic property, the Court split into two camps. To the more 
speech-protective group, speech on public property was permit-
ted as long as it was functionally compatible with the use to 
which the property was being put. As the Court proclaimed in 
Tinker v. Des Moines/9 students do not leave their First 
Amendment rights at the school house door. Indeed, citizens do 
not necessarily leave their freedom to speak outside of any pub-
lic buildings or property.80 The state's ownership of the property 
where speech occurred was of little significance. The only 
proper justification for restricting speech in a public building was 
79. 393 u.s. 503,506 (1969). 
80. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 813· 
22 (1985) (Blackmun and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); United States Postal Serv. v. Council 
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 142-152 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Greer 
v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828,857-864 (1976) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
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that it interfered with the government's ability to conduct its 
business there.81 
Not only was there a clear presumption in favor of speech, 
but the government's practice of allowing certain speakers access 
to property while denying it to others constituted damning evi-
dence that undermined the state's claims that the speech of ex-
cluded speakers was incompatible with the property's functions. 82 
If it did not substantially interfere with the functioning of the in-
ternal mail system of a school to allow one union access to 
teacher mail boxes, the state would bear a substantial burden in 
trying to explain why a competing union could be prohibited 
from using the same forum.83 Selectivity in access by the State in 
allowing only certain speakers to use public property for expres-
sive purposes was held against the State. Most public property 
under this analysis would be some form of limited public forum. 
The alternative perspective reversed the presumption. Un-
der this approach, as long as speech regulations did not discrimi-
nate on the basis of viewpoint, the courts must defer to the 
judgement of the property's administrator. Even content-
discriminatory regulations would be leniently reviewed. In the 
most dramatic change in perspective, selectivity in access was 
turned on its head. Now the state's decision to keep certain 
groups and speakers out of the forum was self-justifying in that it 
fortified the state's assertion that it did not intend to permit such 
speakers general access to the forum.84 Since the scope of tradi-
tional public forums was narrowly defined under this model and 
effectively limited to streets and parks, all other public property 
could now be closed to most if not all expressive activity. Unless 
the state deliberately chooses to open such property to expres-
sive activity, public property is a non-public forum. 85 
81. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 711 (1992) (Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Ko· 
kinda, 497 U.S. 720, 743 (1990) (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 816 (Blackmun and Brennan, 11., dissenting); Greenburgh Civic 
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 149-50 (Marshall, 1., dissenting); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. at 859-62 
(Brennan and Marshall, 11., dissenting). 
82. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 749-52 (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, JJ., dis-
senting); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 817,819-20 (Blackmun, Brennan, JJ., dissenting). 
83. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 66-71 (1983) 
(Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, 11., dissenting). 
84. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 751 (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, 11., dissent-
ing) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun and Brennan, 11., dissenting)); Cor-
nelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05. 
85. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805. 
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When restrictions on speech in a non-public forum are 
challenged, viewpoint discriminatory regulations receive rigor-
ous review, but content-discriminatory regulations will be upheld 
as long as they are reasonable. The standard of review for con-
tent-neutral regulations is less clear. The Court seems to con-
sider the same three factors it evaluates when it reviews a con-
tent-neutral regulation in a traditional public forum, but it 
applies that standard with far less rigor. Solicitation in a large 
metropolitan airport and on interior sidewalks in front of a post 
office, for example, can be entirely prohibited to avoid conges-
tion and to Rrotect travelers from being confronted by requests 
for support, and four justices were willing to uphold a ban on 
all leafleting in the airport case.87 Unless one believes that the 
Court would uphold similar restrictions on expressive activity in 
a busy, downtown street, the fact that the airport and the interior 
sidewalk were classified as non-public forums must carry some 
of the weight in explaining these opinions.88 
86. Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672, 683-84 (1992); Kokinda, 497 
U.S. at 732-37. 
87. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830, 831-32 
(1992) (Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Thomas, JJ., dissenting) 
88. A recent 7th Circuit opinion demonstrates the stark contrast between the range 
of expressive activities that must be permitted in a traditional public forum and the far 
more silent and restricted world of the non-public forum. Plaintiffs in Chicago Acorn, 
SEIU Local No. 880 v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 
1998) wanted to engage in a wide variety of expressive activities including leafleting, so-
liciting signatures on petitions, chanting, demonstrating and carrying signs and banners 
on the Navy Pier in downtown Chicago, an area described by the court as "part park, 
part meeting and exhibition facility, part shopping emporium (and] part amusement 
park." ld. at 698. The state authority that manages the pier denied them permission to 
do so. 
In denying most of plaintiffs' first amendment claims, Judge Posner determined that 
the pier was a non-public forum. As such, plaintiffs could not be prevented from distrib-
uting leaflets in open areas on the Pier, but in all other respects their expressive activity 
could be restricted far more severely than would be the case if plaintiffs sought access to 
a traditional public forum. In Judge Posner's words, the Court's conclusion that the Pier 
is a non-public forum effectively rejected 
any suggestion that the plaintiffs have a right to picket, stage marches, hold 
demonstrations, wave posters, shout through bullhorns or public-address sys-
tems, solicit passersby for money or signatures, or harangue them from soap-
boxes, as they could do (subject of course to reasonable restrictions) on Michi-
gan Avenue, on the plaza outside the Daley Center, on the sidewalks outside 
the federal courthouse on Dearborn A venue or at the other familiar Chicago 
sites for political expression. 
Id. at 702. See also ISKON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 955-56 (D.C Cir. 
1995) (distinguishing review of content-neutral regulations restricting soliciting in a non-
public forum from review of content-neutral regulations restricting soliciting in a public 
forum). But see Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319, 
1323 (1st Cir. 1993) (suggesting that common standard of review is applied to content-
neutral regulations in public and non-public forums). 
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In practical terms, the impact of the current approach could 
not be more one-sided. If the property is classified as a non-
public forum, the speech regulation is virtually always upheld. 
Only a complete ban on leafleting has been found to be an un-
reasonable time, place, and manner rule,89 all challenged con-
tent-discriminatory regulations have been upheld,90 and only 
prohibitions against reli~ious speech have been found to be 
viewpoint discriminatory. 1 
The lack of intellectual coherence in the Court's decisions is 
almost as troubling as the effect of its decisions on speech oppor-
tunities. While the line between content-neutral and content-
discriminatory regulations has its ambiguities, it seems far more 
solidly grounded than the distinction between content and view-
point discrimination in recent cases. Yet it is the latter distinc-
tion on which the rigor of review depends for speech regulations 
on virtually all public property. We might actually have more 
clarity if the Court changed the level of review for both content 
and viewpoint discriminatory regulations of speech on public 
property other than streets and parks to some form of serious 
scrutiny, analogous to the "substantially connected to an impor-
tant interest" standard used in gender discrimination cases. The 
prohibition of one point of view in a politically salient debate is 
difficult to justify, after all, under any standard of review with 
some bite to it. 
Not only is the current standard hard to apply, it is also dif-
ficult to understand how it can be reconciled with other recent 
First Amendment decisions. The current Court, for example, 
finds content-discrimination to be so troubling and so commonly 
indicative of an intent to suppress ideas than even content-
discriminatory regulations within a category of unprotected 
89. Lee, 505 U.S. at 831. All other content-neutral regulations of speech in a non-
public forum were upheld. See, e.g., Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 683-
85 (upholding ban on solicitation in airport); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 731-37 (upholding ban 
on solicitation on interior sidewalk in front of post office); Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 
U.S. at 128-34 (upholding ban on placement of unstamped material in letter boxes); City 
Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding ordinance pro-
hibiting posting of signs on public utility poles). 
90. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806-11 (upholding exclusion of advocacy groups from 
federal charity drive); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 50-
55 (upholding decision allowing union chosen to be bargaining representative of teach-
ers, but no other competing unions, access to interschool mail system). 
91. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). There is some lack 
of clarity as to whether the forums in these cases were non-public forums or limited pub-
he forums. The rule prohibiting viewpoint discriminatory regulations would apply in ei-
ther case. 
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speech must receive strict scrutiny.92 Yet content-discriminatory 
regulations of fully protected speech including debate on public 
policy issues can be prohibited on any property owned by the 
government, other than streets and parks, as long as it is "rea-
sonable" to do so. 
2. Public Schools and Forum Doctrine 
a. Conceptualizing Schools as Forums 
With regard to the second set of issues, the scope of catego-
ries and problems of classification, Farber and I part company 
initially on the way we approach important public school speech 
cases, specifically Tinker and Hazelwood. For Farber, these are 
custodial institution cases that are properly analyzed along with 
cases dealing with regulations that limit the speech of military 
personnel or prisoners. Because of the custodial relationship be-
tween students and school authorities, Farber suggests that stu-
dent speech at least in elementary and high schools receives far 
less protection than speech in other locations. In light of the 
greater maturity of the student body and the tradition of aca-
demic freedom, however, the First Amendment protects student 
speech at public colleges and universities "with its normal 
vigor."93 
From my perspective, it is a mistake to treat the public 
schools as a unique institution for First Amendment purposes. 
Indeed, I think it is generally problematic to construe cases in-
volving any particular context in which speech regulations occur 
as a separate category or line of authority that is somehow dis-
tinct from the general doctrinal rules governing the review of 
speech regulations.94 Thus, I think the lessons of cases decided in 
public school contexts are more universal than their setting, and 
reflect broader free speech principles. 
To my mind, Tinker is an important limited public forum 
case. Indeed, it is a quintessential example of the functional 
compatibility approach to reviewing speech regulations in a lim-
ited public forum. Hazelwood, on the other hand, is a govern-
92. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
93. Farber, First Amendment at 190 (cited in note 5). 
94. I think the military and prisons are special circumstances, not so much because 
they are custodial institutions, but because of the security concerns, legitimation of vio-
lence, consensual loss of liberty or loss of liberty as punishment, and other factors that 
distinguish these government operations from normal life. 
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ment speech case, or at least a government sponsorship case, 
that helps courts identify the important but narrow line that 
separates the application of public forum and government 
speech doctrine. These cases play a role both in understanding 
the evolution of public forum and government speech doctrine 
and in illustrating the ambiguity and indeterminacy of the cur-
rent Court's approach to these issues. A great deal is lost, I 
think, if these cases are set aside as unique, custodial cases. 
Indeed, it is not clear to me that either of these cases can be 
doctrinally isolated in the way that Farber suggests. While Far-
ber is certainly correct that in one sense student speech receives 
greater protection at colleges and universities than at a high 
school, I am not sure that the standard of review applied in col-
lege cases is formally any different than the functional compati-
bility analysis applied in Tinker. All of the early free speech on 
university campus cases, Healy v. James, 95Papish v. Board ot Cu-
rators of the University of Missouri, 96 and Widmar v. Vincent cite 
Tinker with approval. All but Widmar seem to apply a func-
tional compatibility analysis, and Widmar is distinct only because 
the University in that case designated a wider and better pro-
tected forum for student speech than a Tinker type analysis 
would require. 
Nor is it clear to me that the censorship of a college news-
paper by a campus media board would receive any more rigor-
ous review than the Court applied to the restrictions on a high 
school newspaper at issue in Hazelwood. While the Court left 
this issue open,98 it is hard to understand why the Constitution 
prohibits a public university from publishing a bland, rigorously 
censored periodical with student staff. Publishing such a paper 
might not be sound educational policy, but the Constitution pro-
vides little basis for telling college administrators that they have 
only two choices: (1) they can subsidize a generally uncontrolled 
student paper at taxpayer expense with administrative oversight 
subject to rigorous judicial review; or (2) they can decline to 
publish a student paper altogether. At a minimum, the issue is 
an open and interesting one-but the fact that Hazelwood might 
very well apply to a college newspaper certainly casts some 
doubt on the suggestion that its holding is predicated on the cus-
todial nature of the public schools. 
95. 408 u.s. 169 (1972). 
96. 410 u.s. 667 (1973). 
97. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
98. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988). 
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b. Distinguishing the Administration of Limited and Non-Public 
Forums from Government Speech and Government Sponsored 
Speech 
Construed as a limited public forum case, Tinker is impor-
tant not only because it recognizes that a rigorous, functional 
compatibility standard of review may apply to property that is 
not a traditional public forum (although in this regard it is an ex-
cellent case to juxtapose next to the Court's more recent cases 
applying a "reasonableness" standard of review to illustrate just 
how much more protection speech received under this earlier 
approach). Tinker and Hazelwood taken together are significant 
cases because they raise difficult questions that require an analy-
sis of the limits of the Court's forum doctrine. Even in a non-
public forum, speech regulations are subject to some important 
First Amendment constraints. Viewpoint discrimination in a 
non-public forum will be subject to strict scrutiny, and content-
discriminatory and content-neutral regulations must at least be 
reasonable. A ban on all expression would be subject to some 
level of review and for some forums, such as the public schools, 
would be clearly unconstitutional.99 Certainly, all speech regula-
tions governing a non-public forum are subject to judicial review. 
Surely, however, there is public property on which speech 
occurs that is not subject to these constraints. For some prop-
erty, even viewpoint discrimination is permissible and the prop-
erty can be generally closed to all expression at the discretion of 
the administrator. Indeed, it is unlikely that the courts should be 
called on to review speech restrictions on such property at all. 
The only proper decision for a court would be to decide whether 
or not the property in question should be construed to be a fo-
rum of any kind. To use an obvious example, it is hard to imag-
ine a federal court evaluating the President's decisions as to who 
gets access to the Oval Office to speak with him. In a less loca-
tion-specific context, Hazelwood certainly suggests that the fed-
eral courts are not the appropriate institution to second guess 
the editorial judgements of a high school newspaper faculty ad-
viser or principal. And from a related perspective, it is argued 
that government may discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in at 
least some circumstances when it decides whether or not to sub-
sidize speech. What criteria, however, distinguishes a non-public 
99. The holding of Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969), that private student speech at a public school can only be restricted if it is func-
tionally incompatible with the school's educational program remains good law. 
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forum subject to the constitutional prohibition against viewpoint 
discrimination from the kind of property described above that 
isn't a forum at all? And in what sense, if any, does the distinc-
tion between forums and non-forums control the way that the 
courts evaluate government spending decisions that subsidize 
expression? 
While the Court has struggled with the problem of govern-
ment supported speech in schools, both in the context of the cen-
sorship of a high school newspaper in Hazelwood and in re-
sponse to a school boards decision to remove books from the 
school library because of their content in Board of Education v. 
Pica, 100 Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia 101 is the school case that links spending decisions and 
public forum doctrine inextricably together. In Rosenberger, the 
Court concluded that the funding system by which the Univer-
sity of Virginia allocated subsidies among students groups en-
gaged in expressive activity constituted a limited public forum 
because the University provided financial support to all student 
groups as a matter of course. Having created a limited public fo-
rum by adopting this funding framework, the University could 
not then discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in distributing 
subsidies. Accordingly, the University's decision not to fund a 
student religious periodical was struck down as unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination.102 Analogizing public forum cases, 
such as Widmar, where student groups were granted access to 
university classrooms to hold meetings, to more direct financial 
subsidies, the Court flatly rejected the University's argument 
that subsidj' decisions must be distinguished from forum access 
decisions. 10 
The Court carefully distinguished the subsidies for student 
organizations in Rosenberger from government speech cases, 
however. The holding in Rosenberger was not intended to jeop-
ardize government discretion in designing the University's edu-
cational curriculum. The subsidy scheme at issue in Rosenberger 
could be sharply distinguished from curriculum decisions be-
cause the University officially and explicitly disclaimed any con-
trol over, or responsibility for, the student speech it supported 
100. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
101. 515 u.s. 819 (1995). 
102. ld. at 819-37. 
103. ld. at 832-36. 
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and denied any suggestion that the student groups were speaking 
as the University's agents. 104 
This distinction may hold as far as it goes, but that may be a 
relatively short distance. Left unanswered in Rosenberger was 
the question of how the Court would evaluate a funding scheme 
in which the University selectively chose to subsidize only those 
student groups whose activities best furthered the University's 
educational objectives. Suppose the University funded only 
those particular student activities that contributed most effec-
tively to its educational enterprise and varied its support de-
pending on the quality of the student groups' programs. Would 
a funding scheme of this kind be evaluated as a government 
speech decision which may involve viewpoint discrimination in 
at least some circumstances or would this funding framework 
constitute a kind of limited or non-public forum where viewpoint 
discrimination is prohibited? There is even the possibility that 
such decisions should be reviewed under some new doctrinal 
category. 105 
The Court's decisions last term in Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission v. Forbes1rx. and National Endowment of 
the Arts v. Finley107 shed some light on this issue.108 In Forbes, the 
Court clarified the distinction between limited or designated 
public forums and non-public forums. In both cases, the gov-
ernment may permit only certain categories of speakers to use 
public property for expressive purposes. What divides the two 
kinds of fora is whether the government intends to provide 
"general access" or "selective access" within the class of speakers 
permitted to use the property at all: 
On the one hand, the government creates a designated 
public forum when it makes its property generally available to 
a certain class of speakers .... On the other hand, the gov-
ernment does not create a designated public forum when it 
104. ld. at 834-35. 
105. See National Endowment for the Ans v. Finley, 118 S. a. 2168, 2192 (1998) 
(Souter J., dissenting) (arguing that "[i)f the student activities fund at issue in Rosenber-
ger had awarded competitive, merit-based grants to only 50%, or even 5%, of the appli-
cants, on the basis of 'journalistic merit taking into consideration the message of the 
newspaper,' it is obvious beyond peradventure that the Court would not have come out 
differently, leaving the University free to refuse funding after considering a publications's 
Christian perspective"). 
106. 118 s. a. 1633 (1998). 
107. 118 S. Ct. 2168. 
108. Farber, of course, can not be faulted for not considering these opinions in his 
book. On the other hand, there is little sense in my ignoring the Court's reasoning in 
these cases. 
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does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum 
to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as 
individuals, 'obtain permission' to use it. 109 
133 
While Forbes clarifies the difference between a designated 
public forum and a non-public forum by identifying the latter as 
public property where the government only permits "selective 
access," this distinction complicates the Court's attempt to dif-
ferentiate a non-public forum from property that is not a forum 
at all. For doctrinal purposes, there is a critical difference be-
tween a non-public forum and a non-forum because viewpoint 
discrimination is only prohibited in the former context. Indeed, 
Justice Kennedy argues with considerable persuasiveness in 
Forbes that when the administration of public property and gov-
ernmental functions requires the regular exercise of "editorial 
discretion," it should not be subject to judicial review to deter-
mine if it involves viewpoint discrimination.110 Examples of deci-
sions that might be classified as the administration of non-
forums include public television broadcasting judgements, "a 
university selecting a commencement speaker, a public institu-
tion selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a public school 
prescribing its curriculum."111 
What the Court fails to explain in Forbes, however, is how 
we are to distinguish "selective access" in permitting speakers to 
use public property or resources- the hallmark of the non-public 
forum- from the "editorial discretion" that identifies the ad-
ministration of a non-forum. This doctrinal chicken comes home 
to roost in National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley. 112 In Finley, 
the Court rejects a facial challenge to legislation requiring the 
NEA to take general standards of decency into account in 
awarding government grants to artists. While Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion in Finley construes the statutory 
provision at issue not to require viewpoint discrimination in the 
award of grants,113 Justice Scalia concurring and Justice Souter in 
109. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804). 
110. Id at 1639-40. 
111. Id. at 1639. 
112. 118 S. Ct. 2168. 
113. In reauthorizing the National Endowment of the Arts, Congress provided that 
no grant should be awarded under the program except "in accordance with regulations 
issued and procedures established by the Chairperson. In establishing such regulations 
and procedures, the Chairperson shall ensure that ... artistic excellence and artistic merit 
are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general stan-
dards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." 
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dissent go head to head on the issue that the majority avoids. 
Souter argues that viewpoint discrimination in the award of ar-
tistic grants clearly violates the First Amendment' 14 while Scalia, 
in tum, contends that the decision not to fund indecent art is so 
obviously constitutional that it would be preposterous to suggest 
otherwise. 115 
The problem for Scalia, of course, is how to distinguish Ro-
senberger. He does so with a single sentence. "Rosenberger, as 
the Court explains ... found the [university's] viewpoint dis-
crimination unconstitutional, not because funding of 'private' 
speech was involved, but because the government had estab-
lished a limited public forum-to which the NEA's granting of 
highly selective (if not highly discriminating) awards bears no re-
semblance."116 That Rosenberger involved the creation of a lim-
ited public forum is true enough, but it is also entirely irrelevant 
to the question of whether viewpoint discrimination in the award 
of subsidies violates the First Amendment. The prohibition 
against viewpoint discrimination is just as applicable to non-
public forums as it is to limited public forums. More impor-
tantly, the NEA's selectivity in awarding grants, the exclusive 
factor that Scalia identifies as distinguishing Rosenberger from 
Finley, seems to be the very factor that Justice Kennedy identi-
fied in Forbes as the basis for distinguishing a limited public fo-
rum from a non-public forum. Scalia entirely ducks the question 
of why he believes that NEA selectivity in providing subsidies to 
works of artistic excellence is the kind of selectivity that creates 
a non-forum where viewpoint discrimination is tolerated and not 
the kind of selectivity that creates a non-public forum where 
viewpoint discrimination is prohibited. 117 
Id at 2173 n.*. To implement this provision the NEA adopted a resolution to ensure 
that members of advisory panels reviewing grant applications reflected geographic, aes-
thetic, and ethnic diversity. Id at 2173. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of this provision, Justice O'Connor concluded that 
this legislative requirement did not constitute viewpoint discrimination because (1) it 
merely suggested that the NEA take decency and respect for American values into ac-
count as additional criteria to consider-not as the dispositive basis for rejecting specific 
grant applications for art that expressed a particular viewpoint, (2) it was directed at "re-
forming procedures rather than precluding speech," and (3) it suggested a standard, de-
cency and respect for American values, that is so subjective and indeterminate that it can 
not be understood to apply to any particular viewpoint. Id at 2175-78. 
114. ld at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
115. ld at 2183 (Scalia and Thomas, 1.1., dissenting). 
116. Id. at 2184 (emphasis added). 
117. O'Connor's majority opinion distinguishes Rosenberger in more detail but on 
essentially the same grounds as Scalia. ld at 2178. She also fails to explain why the 
competitive process by which NEA grants are awarded should not be construed to be a 
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Part of the answer, I think, comes from the Forbes decision 
and the rest may be suggested by the Court's reasoning in Tinker 
and Hazelwood, the cases with which I began this discussion. 
Justice Kennedy's description of non-forums in Forbes is focused 
on one important identifying criteria. Forum doctrine and its 
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is inappropriate in 
those circumstances when government administrators must exer-
cise editorial discretion.ns The idea of editorial discretion ex-
pression connotes a function that is expressive in nature, and all 
the examples Kennedy cites confirm this understanding.119 This 
suggests that when the government property, program, or sub-
sidy system at issue serves some expressive purpose, government 
selectivity in employing private speech to further that purpose 
should not be understood to create a forum for First Amend-
ment purposes. 
This distinction between property that serves expressive and 
non-expressive purposes tracks Kennedy's argument against ju-
dicial review of editorial choices in administrating a non-forum. 
When the state regulates speech on government property that 
serves a non-expressive purpose, as it does when it restricts ral-
lies in the parking lot in front of the county jail, for example, the 
state will often be able to further its legitimate objectives with-
out taking the message of the regulated speakers into account. 
In those few circumstances when the state must take the com-
municative impact of the message into account, courts will typi-
cally have a clear understanding of the nature of the state's in-
terest and can meaningfully test the functional compatibility of 
the restricted message with the use to which the property is be-
ing put. When government property serves an expressive pur-
pose-the pages of a law review at a public law school, for ex-
ample- virtually every decision of the administrator of the 
property, the law review editors, may involve content and view-
point discrimination. Furthermore, the reviewing Court has no 
firm basis for determining whether any editorial decision is con-
sistent with the purpose to which the property is being put. 
Nothing in the Constitution provides a basis for evaluating the 
appropriate goals of academic periodicals and, as anyone who 
has marketed articles to law reviews understands all too well, 
non-public forum to which selective access is provided to only those speakers who are 
individually granted permission to participate in the government's subsidy program. 
118. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1639-40 (1998). 
119. Id at 1639. See note 110 and accompanying text. 
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there is little consensus on what constitutes a sensible editorial 
decision. 120 
The distinction between Tinker and Hazelwood is consistent 
with this analysis. The high school newspaper censored in Ha-
zelwood primarily served an expressive purpose. Editorial deci-
sions about the articles included in an issue are inherently con-
tent-based. Private student speech in the halls and classrooms 
before and after class, the kind of student speech that was at is-
sue in Tinker, however, was not part of the high school's pro-
gram. Rules governing such expressive activity primarily served 
order and efficiency interests. Accordingly, it made a great deal 
of practical sense to immunize the former but not the latter class 
of decisions from serious judicial review.121 
The opinion in Hazelwood identifies another important fac-
tor to consider in identifying non-forums. Unlike the regulation 
of private student speech, the censorship of the high school 
newspaper involved the "educators' authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expres-
sive activities that students, parents, and members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school."122 Unlike the black armbands worn by students in 
Tinker, the content of the school newspaper might be reasonably 
"attributed to the school."123 Because government has a greater 
need to regulate speech in circumstances when such associations 
are highly likely to be perceived, even when the private speaker 
is not actually speaking for the government, there is a more le-
120. Constitutional Commentary, of course, is a notable and welcome exception to 
the rule in this regard. 
121. Judge Posner comes close to making this exact point in Chicago Acorn, SE/U 
Local No. 880 v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998). The 
state authority (MPEA) controlling access to meeting rooms located at the Navy Pier 
allowed the Democratic Party to rent facilities at a heavily discounted rate because of the 
"enormous ... favorable publicity" that the Democratic Party's event was expected to 
generate for the pier. Id. at 699. The MPEA conceded that comparably favorable rental 
rates would not be offered to less popular political groups. When this discriminatory 
policy was challenged on First Amendment grounds, the MPEA, citing Arkansas Educa-
tional Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1988), argued that it should be 
granted the "editorial discretion" to provide popular political groups superior access to 
its facilities than groups with less public support. In rejecting this argument, Judge Pos-
ner distinguished the public television station in Forbes from the MPEA. "Whenever the 
government is in the business of speech," Posner explained, "the exercise of editorial 
judgment is inescapable . . . . But Navy Pier is not a producer of speech; it is a renter of 
premises to speakers. It need not make any editorial judgments about the content of the 
speech in its meeting rooms [to fulfill its function]." Id at 701. 
122. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
123. Id 
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gitimate basis for identifying such property as a non-forum 
rather than a non-public forum. 124 
III. HATE SPEECH, INDECENT SPEECH, AND THE 
TENSION BETWEEN THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
As a general rule, book reviews should not be longer than 
the books they discuss. The two previous sections compare at 
considerable length the different approaches to free speech is-
sues that I would take with those of Professor Farber. They 
should be sufficient to illustrate the primary thesis of this review. 
In this section, I will simply suggest some additional areas where 
our approaches would differ substantially. 
A. REGULATING HATE SPEECH AND HATE CRIMES 
Farber devotes a long chapter in his book to offensive lan-
guage and hate speech with a clear emphasis on the latter topic. 
I want to comment briefly on only one part of this section, 125 
Farber's analysis of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 126 a case in which 
the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting the expression 
of hate speech, and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 121 a case in which the 
Court upheld an enhanced sentence for perpetrators of hate 
crimes. I find these cases to be inordinately difficult ones to dis-
cuss and to teach and I concur completely with Farber's decision 
to allocate substantial pages to them. Once again, however, I 
find us aligned on different approaches to the problem. 
In R.A. V., the Court strictly scrutinized and invalidated a 
municipal ordinance prohibiting expressive activity "which one 
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm 
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion 
124. This analysis suggests that government might transform a non-forum into a non-
public forum or even a limited public forum through the effective use of disclaimers. See 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834-35 (1995). The analy-
sis does not apply as easily, however, to property that constitutes a traditional public fo-
rum. See Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). 
While disclaimers might be relevant to an Establishment Clause challenge to speech in a 
traditional public forum, the lack of disclaimers does not alter the nature of a traditional 
public forum even if it is in a location where association with governments are likely. 
125. Farber, First Amendment at 109-17 (cited in note 5). 
126. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
127. 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
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or gender."128 The Minnesota Supreme Court construed the 
statute to apply only to unprotected "fighting words."129 
Farber describes Justice Scalia's reasoning in R.A. V. with 
considerable care and carefully identifies many of the fault lines 
that have been the basis of critical challenges to this opinion. 
First, Scalia argues that unprotected speech is still speech for 
constitutional purposes. It can not be analogized to non-
expressive conduct that is entirely outside the scope of First 
Amendment protection. Accordingly, laws that discriminate on 
the basis of content or viewpoint within a category of unpro-
tected speech must receive the same level of scrutiny applied to 
content and viewpoint discriminatory regulations of fully pro-
tected speech. Do 
Farber agrees with the first part of Scalia's analysis. Unpro-
tected speech is speech.131 The harder question is whether con-
tent discriminatory regulations of unprotected speech should re-
ceive rigorous scrutiny and be struck down. Farber recognizes 
that this is a tough question because some content-based regula-
tions of unprotected speech seem to be permissible while others 
much more clearly deserve to be invalidated. Somewhat chari-
tably, he notes that even "Justice Scalia had some difficulty in 
explaining when content based regulation of fighting words is or 
is not allowed."132 
The dividing line for Scalia is whether a content discrimina-
tory regulation of unprotected speech serves the purpose of sup-
pressing ideas. And he concludes that laws prohibiting racist 
fighting words are enacted for just such a purpose-to combat 
and discourage the expression of racist ideas. There are other 
reasons for prohibiting the expression of racist fighting words, of 
course. A community might reasonably want to protect indi-
viduals from the injurious effects of such language. Speakers 
who hurl racist epithets at their targets cause their victims sig-
nificant emotional harm. But this kind of an injury can be effec-
tively prevented by a broader law that prohibits all fighting 
words. To Scalia, the deliberate limitation of the challenged 
regulation to only racist fighting words suggests that it is directed 
not at the effect of such speech, but rather at the content and 
128. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380. 
129. Id at 381. 
130. Farber, First Amendment at 110-11 (cited in note 5). 
131. Id 
132. Id at 111. 
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ideas communicated bX it. A law serving such a purpose violates 
the First Amendment. 33 
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 134 however, the Court upheld a 
statute enhancing the penalty for offenses, such as acts of bat-
tery, when the defendant deliberately "selects the person against 
whom the crime ... is committed ... because of the race, relig-
ion, color, disability ... of that person."135 To the Court, this hate 
crimes statute imposed a higher penalty for certain acts based on 
the perpetrator's invidious motives and the effect or increased 
harm that racially motivated assaults cause victims and society.136 
Further, for both Farber and the Court, the law's reference to 
the intent and effect of an individual's conduct in identifying 
criminal behavior raised little in the way of constitutional con-
cerns. Criminal statutes commonly are directed at the intent and 
effect of behavior.137 Accordingly, the Court distinguished its re-
cent holding in R.A. V. from Mitchell by noting that, "whereas 
the ordinance struck down in R.A. V. was explicitly directed at 
expression ... , the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unpro-
tected by the First Amendment."138 
Building on this foundation, Farber asks intriguing ques-
tions to probe the meaning of the different results in these two 
cases. If a penalty enhancement statute is constitutional when 
an assailant selects his victim on the basis of the victim's race, 
would the law still be constitutional if the assault was intended to 
communicate an expressive message,139 that, for example, black 
people should stay out of this part of town? Farber then jumps to 
the question of whether the state could enhance the penalty for 
the use of racially motivated fighting words as a predicate for 
examining whether any hate speech regulation might survive 
constitutional scrutiny under the R.A. V. and Mitchell holdings. 
If a hate crimes statute focusing on the assailant's motive would 
be constitutional even if the assault communicated a racist mes-
sage, perhaps a hate speech ordinance might also be constitu-
tional if it was directed at the speaker's motive in choosing to 
express fighting words to a black person, rather than the actual 
content of what was said. Farber concludes that such a provision 
133. Id at 116. 
134. 508 u.s. 476 (1993). 
135. I d. at 480. 
136. Id. at 487-88. 
137. Farber, First Amendment at 114-15, 117 (cited in note 5). 
138. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487. 
139. Farber, First Amendment at 115 (cited in note 5). 
140 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.16:101 
might be constitutional if it was part of a carefully drawn statute. 
Certainly, as a formal matter Farber argues, "a distinction based 
on motivation differs from one based on content."140 Thus, a law 
focusing on the intent and effect of prohibited behavior, such as 
a law punishing racial harassment that encompassed expressive 
activities involvin?, the use of hate speech, might withstand con-
stitutional review. 41 
There is nothing wrong with Farber deciding to focus on the 
distinction between motive and content in discussing these cases. 
Farber is clearly correct when he describes how a law directed at 
the defendant's motive in selecting his victim would apply in a 
situation where the speaker used racially neutral, abusive lan-
guage to insult a black person for racist reasons while a content 
based law prohibiting the use of racist language would not reach 
such conduct. He is also technically correct that a speaker using 
racist language may have chosen his victim for non-racist reasons 
and would not have his penalty enhanced under a law directed at 
the defendant's racial motive in choosing a victim rather than 
the racist content of what was said.142 Further, Farber's discus-
sion of this issue is deliberately tentative. He knows there are 
serious questions about the use of this distinction as a filter for 
determining which laws should receive serious First Amendment 
• 143 
revtew. 
Once again my primary problem with this part of The First 
Amendment lies with what Farber does not say. In my judgement, 
R.A. V. and Mitchell suggest at least four axes on which the deci-
sions in these two cases might turn. These include distinctions 
between motive and content, speech and conduct, content-
discrimination and viewpoint-discrimination and the state objec-
tives of suppressing offensive ideas and avoiding race-based 
harms. I have written at length about R.A. V. and Mitchell with 
regard to the Court's focus on the distinction between speech 
and conduct and its failure to distinguish between content and 
viewpoint-discrimination in the context of regulating unpro-
tected speech.144 In my judgment, these are important and criti-
cal perspectives for understanding these cases, and Farber's ac-
count does not sufficiently address them. 
140. ld. 
141. Id. at 115-16. 
142. ld. at 115. 
143. ld. at 116-17. 
144. Brownstein, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 554-89 (cited in note 33). 
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I also have far more serious misgivings than Farber suggests 
in his book about the viability of distinguishing motive from con-
tent based speech regulations in general and as a basis for under-
standing R.A. V. and Mitchell. While a formal difference be-
tween regulations directed at intent and content clearly exists, it 
was not the ground on which the Court chose to distinguish 
R.A. V. from Mitchell. Rather than characterizing R.A. V. as a 
content-discrimination case and Mitchell as a motive case, the 
Court explicitly chose to explain the irrelevance of R.A. V. to 
hate crime statutes by emphasizing that the law at issue in 
Mitchell was directed at conduct, not speech.145 
I do not think this decision was accidental. The ordinance 
under review in R.A. V. did not identify the speech it prohibited 
by describing its subject in conventional terms. It prohibited ex-
pression "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know 
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of 
race, color. ... "146 In literal terms, the prohibited speech is iden-
tified by the speaker's knowledge of its effect and the cause of 
that effect. In some ways this definition actually straddles the 
line between content and intent. It is after all only a relatively 
short step from doing something with knowledge of its effect to 
doing something with the intent of bringing about that effect. 
Indeed, not only does the language of the ordinance skirt the dis-
tinction between content and motive, the Court itself refers to 
the challenged St. Paul law as "a prohibition of fighting words 
that contain (as the Minnesota Supreme Court re,Peatedly em-
phasized) messages of 'bias-motivated' hatred."14 Thus, it is 
hardly clear that the Court believed that the different results in 
R.A. V. and Mitchell could be satisfactorily explained by distin-
guishing laws directed at the content of speech from laws di-
rected at a person's motive in speaking. 
More importantly, reducing the level of scrutiny applied to 
laws directed at the intent of a speaker in communicating a mes-
sage would significantly undermine the protection provided ex-
pression and facilitate the suppression of ideas. In the great 
majority of instances, we will determine the intent of a speaker 
in communicating a message by looking at the content of what 
he or she says. If the state can escape rigorous review by direct-
ing its laws at the speaker's intent, while it enforces its laws by 
145. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,487 (1993). 
146. R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,380 (1992). 
147. Id. at 392. 
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using the speaker's words as controlling evidence of the 
speaker's motives, many content and viewpoint discriminatory 
laws could be rewritten to accomplish most of their speech sup-
pressive objective in this way without fear of judicial interven-
tion. The new, intent-based laws might not capture every mes-
sage the state would hope to suppress, but their net will stretch 
sufficiently wide to reach almost as many statements as a more 
precise content-discriminatory regulation.148 And the chilling ef-
fect of such laws will far outdistance their actual scope. If the 
state's goal is to suppress unpopular speech, an intent-based law 
is more than good enough for government work. 
Finally, it is hard to understand why Justice Scalia, the 
author of the R.A. V. decision, would be willing to accept the 
risks to freedom of speech that adoption of a motive and content 
distinction would create. Farber suggests that Scalia, as "a lead-
ing judicial advocate of formalism," might be willing to accept 
this admittedly formalistic distinction,149 but I think Farber may 
misread R.A. V. in this respect. Scalia may have started his 
analysis in R.A. V. with a formalistic framework in mind, but he 
seems to have surrendered any commitment to such an approach 
by the end of the opinion. After describing one formal excep-
tion after another to his proposed rule that content-
discriminatory regulations within a category of unprotected 
speech must receive strict scrutiny, Scalia appears to recognize 
the futility of the task he has assigned to himself.150 Accordingly, 
at the end of the opinion he accepts the entirely non-formalistic 
conclusion that the state may selectively proscribe some in-
stances of fighting words but not others "so long as the nature of 
148. Few cases address the issue of whether punishing a speaker for his motive in 
expressing a message should receive less rigorous review than sanctions based on the 
content of the message itself, and none discuss it thoughtfully. The Court does say in 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995), that "[t]he 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology 
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction," but it is 
hard to know exactly what the Court intended to convey in making this statement. On 
occasion lower courts have suggested, for example, that discrimination based on the re· 
ligious perspective of the speaker is impermissible, but it is unclear as a formal matter 
whether religiously motivated expression is the equivalent of expression from a religious 
perspective for constitutional purposes. See, e.g., Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion 
County Building Authority, 909 F. Supp. 1187, 1195 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (explaining that "a 
particular expression that emanates from a religious perspective is likely to be a view-
point that may not be suppressed if other viewpoints on the same general toptc are al-
lowed"). 
149. Farber, First Amendment at 116 (cited in note 5). 
150. Brownstein, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 626 (cited in note 33). 
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the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possi-
bility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."151 
Notwithstanding his apparent retreat in R.A. V., Scalia is still 
a formalist. I think his ultimate concession at the end of R.A. V. 
doesn't suggest that he loves formalism any less, but rather that 
he hates the suppression of ideas even more. Scalia's concern, 
whether justified or not, that hate speech statutes involve at-
tempts by the state to achieve that constitutionally prohibited 
purpose is clearly the driving force that compels him to hack 
through the convoluted doctrinal thicket he confronts in R.A. V. 
instead of taking the easy way around the problem offered by 
the concurring justices and striking the law down on overbreadth 
grounds.152 It is difficult for me to believe that Scalia, having 
worked so hard to prevent the suppression of ideas in the con-
text of hate speech regulations, would accept a distinction be-
tween motive based and content based laws that permits the 
state to circumvent First Amendment barriers against ideologi-
cal censorship so easily. 
B. INDECENT SPEECH 
Farber really doesn't have a chapter in his book devoted to 
the regulation of indecent speech. The cases dealing with this 
issue are dispersed throuRhout The First Amendment. He dis-
cusses Cohen v. California 3 and Erznoznik v. Jacksonvil/e 154 in a 
very brief section155 sandwiched in between a short description of 
fighting words and hostile audience cases and a much longer 
analysis of R.A. V. and the regulation of hate speech. He in-
cludes a thorough discussion of the dispersal zoning cases, 
Young v. American Mini Theatres156 and Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, 157 and an analysis of secondary effects doctrine as part 
of the chapter on Sexual Material.158 Farber characterizes these 
cases as reflecting a "zoning approach" to the regulation of sexu-
ally graphic materials.159 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 111J is men-
151. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 390. 
152. Id at 3Y7 (White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, 1.1., concurring in judgment). 
153. 403 U.S. 15 (1 Y71 ). 
154. 422 U.S. 205 (1Y75). 
155. Farber, First Amendment at 107-0Y (cited in note 5). 
156. 427 U.S. 50 (1Y76). 
157. 475 U.S. 41 (1Y86). 
158. Farber, First Amendment at 136-41 (cited in note 5). 
15Y. Id at 136. 
160. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
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tioned in passing as an example of time zoning in this section.161 
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. 
v. FCC62 and Reno v. ACLU63 are described briefly in this sec-
tion as representing a retreat from Pacifica.164 They are noted 
again in the chapter on the media but not with regard to the 
regulation of indecent speech.165 Sable Communications of Cali-
fornia v. FCC, 166 the dial-a-porn case, isn't mentioned at all. 
In contrast to Farber's approach, I see a certain virtue in 
concentrating the discussion of the indecent speech cases in one 
location. The review of attempts to regulate indecent speech in-
volves the convergence of several related First Amendment is-
sues: the role of taste and morality as a justification for regulat-
ing speech, the relationship between language and images and 
the content of messages, the extent of the individual's privacy 
interest in not being exposed to language or images that are ex-
perienced as offensive, the viability of attempts to restrict speech 
in allegedly inappropriate locations (Justice Stevens' "gig in the 
parlor" approach to the regulation of indecent speech), 7 and the 
extent to which adult messages and access to expressive materi-
als may be limited to further the state's interest in protecting mi-
nors from harmful speech. While all of these issues are distinct 
and may arise in regulatory contexts other than ones involving 
indecent speech, there may be a common core here that links 
these diverse questions together and gives them more coherence 
than would be the case if they are examined separately. 
Moreover, while many serious First Amendment subjects 
that troubled courts and commentators in the past, such as the 
advocacy of illegal acts, have become matters of settled law to-
day, a point Farber makes with considerable eloquence at the 
end of his book,168 questions relating to the regulation of inde-
cent speech do not fit within this category. This is a continuing 
problem that remains uncomfortably open and unresolved.169 In 
161. Farber, First Amendment at 141 (cited in note 5). 
162. 518 u.s. 727 (1996). 
163. 117 s. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
164. Farber, First Amendment at 141 (cited in note 5). 
165. ld at 223. 
166. 492 u.s. 115 (1989). 
167. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 426, 750 (1978) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty, 272 U.S. 365,388 (1926)). 
168. Farber, First Amendment at 283-84 (cited in note 5). 
169. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2348 (1997) (explaining that for the 
purposes of its decision in this case, the Court "need neither accept nor reject _t~e Gov-
ernment's submission that the First Amendment does not forbtd a blanket prohtbttwn on 
all 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' messages communicated to a 17-year old-no mat-
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particular, I doubt we have seen the end of the battle on the 
question of how much of a burden on adult speech we will toler-
ate in order to protect our children from harmful expression. If 
for no other reason, the enduring quality of this question and the 
lack of consensus on its answer suggests that the regulation of 
indecent speech deserves considerable and focused attention. 
C.. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Since the thesis of this review is that it may no longer be 
possible to write a sophisticated but concise description of free 
speech doctrine that reflects a general consensu~, rather than an 
idiosyncratic perspective, on what the Court's cases mean, one 
would think that this same concern would apply several times 
over when the religion clauses are the subject of discussion. No 
one can put a doctrinal Humpty Dumpty this large, that has bro-
ken into so many pieces, back together again. To his credit, Far-
ber doesn't even try to accomplish this impo~sible task. What he 
does do, and he does it extremely well, is to describe and criti-
cally examine the countervailing principles and theories re-
flected in the cases and commentary intergreting the Free Exer-
cise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 0 
At the end of his discussion, he addresses what he, and I, 
consider the most "fundamental" problem in this area, the re-
view of attempts to accommodate religion.171 In this circum-
stance the two religion clauses seem to be pulling in very differ-
ent directions in that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the 
burdening of religion while the Establishment Clause "seems to 
be tellinH us not to make any special deals for religious 
groups."1 This tension between the clauses causes considerable 
confusion in the case law. Certainly, as Farber points out, there 
is no accepted formula for resolving this issue.173 
Despite this uncertainty, Farber describes three possible 
ways "to escape this dilemma."174 One approach is "secular-
ter how much value the message may contain and regardless of parental approval"}; 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consonium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742 (1996) (suggesting 
it is premature to determine the appropriate doctrinal approach for regulatin~ indecent 
speech on cable television because "of the changes taking place in the law, the technol-
ogy, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications"). 
170. Farber, First Amendment at 243-83 (cited in note 5). 
171. ld at 280-83. 
172. Id at 281. 
173. Id at 281-82 
174. Id 
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ism,"175 a framework that posits a weak Free Exercise Clause but 
a rigorously enforced Establishment Clause. Few accommoda-
tions of religion would be permitted under this model. Another 
approach, what Farber describes as "pluralism,"176 reverses the 
hierarchy. Here, Free Exercise concerns about relieving relig-
ious groups and individuals from burdens trump Establishment 
Clause restrictions on state support for religion. Finally, there is 
a majoritarian model which assigns the question of religious ac-
commodations primarily, if not exclusively, to the political 
branches of government.177 Under this approach, neither the 
Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause is rigorously 
enforced. As a constitutional matter, there is nothing special 
about religion. It is simply another interest to be burdened or 
benefitted through the machinery of democratic deliberation. 
This is all very clearly and concisely presented. The prob-
lem for me is that it leaves out a fourth approach under which 
the courts do not attempt to escape from the tension between 
the religion clauses but rather embrace it as the most effective 
way to promote religious liberty and equality. Under this 
framework both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause are rigorously enforced and the courts must carefully 
chart their way between these two mandates. To be fair, Far-
ber's omission of this fourth alternative may seem more trou-
bling to me than it does to other law professors because this is 
the interpretation of the religion clauses that I support and 
which coincides with my own values.178 
But there is a more objective basis for believing that the 
fourth approach deserves attention. Both of the religion clauses, 
but particularly the Free Exercise Clause, received renewed sub-
stantive content in the 1960's. Engel v. Vitale,179 the case that 
struck down prayer in the public schools was decided in 1962. 
Sherbert v. Verner,180 the seminal case for free exercise exemp-
tions from general laws, was decided the following year by essen-
tially the same Court. Clearly, those justices who rescued free 
exercise doctrine from the feeble protection it provided to re-
ligious beliefs, but not religious practices, under prior prece-
175. Id 
176. Id 
177. !d. at 282. 
178. See Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The 
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 
Ohio St. L.J. 89 (1990). 
179. 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
180. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
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dene81 did not think that doing so was fundamentally inconsis-
tent with a rigorous Establishment Clause. It is important to 
remember that the constitutional vision that served as the source 
of the first meaningful protection of religion practices recognized 
the necessity of giving both the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause their due in deciding First Amendment 
cases. That vision may be more complicated than other First 
Amendment models. And Justice Brennan and the other mem-
bers of the Court that developed this internally conflicted inter-
pretation of the religion clauses may not have adequately ex-
plained their understanding of how the cases they decided fit 
together. Still, if for no other reason than its historical role in 
the development of religion clause doctrine, the commitment to 
a strong Free Exercise Clause and a strong Establishment Clause 
deserves to be the subject of discussion along with the other ap-
proaches Farber very ably describes. 
181. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
